Modern conflicts no longer occur exclusively between sovereign state armies. In many internal armed conflicts, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) play a central role—exercising territorial control, maintaining command structures, and wielding military capacity—yet remaining entirely excluded from the formal codification of international humanitarian law (IHL).
This structural dynamic poses a critical question for international law: how can these non-state actors be effectively bound to legal rules protecting civilians, children, and victims of armed conflict?
Jan Kleffner, Professor of International Law at the Swedish Defence University, examined this evolving paradigm in his 2022 study titled “The Unilateralisation of International Humanitarian Law,” published in the International Review of the Red Cross.
Kleffner explains that alongside traditional treaties and customary rules of warfare, a distinct category of commitments is expanding: unilateral obligations assumed independently by a state or an armed group, irrespective of reciprocal pledges by their opponents.
A prominent example of this trend involves unilateral commitments by NSAGs. Humanitarian organizations such as Geneva Call utilize specialized instruments known as Deeds of Commitment to encourage armed groups to pledge adherence to fundamental standards, including prohibitions on the recruitment of child soldiers, the use of anti-personnel landmines, and instances of sexual violence.
However, Kleffner emphasizes that such voluntary pledges do not substitute existing legal frameworks. Non-state armed groups remain strictly bound by baseline humanitarian obligations under customary IHL and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, regardless of whether they formally sign such instruments.
The importance of this debate stems from the reality that, unlike sovereign states, armed groups possess no formal standing in international law-making, yet make battlefield decisions that directly impact civilian lives. Unilateral commitments can foster a sense of legal ownership and responsibility among these groups. Nevertheless, they must not cultivate the misconception that compliance is purely discretionary or contingent upon voluntary agreement.
A central theme of Kleffner’s analysis concerns the equality of belligerents. While inter-state warfare operates on the presumption that opposing parties are bound by identical legal rules, non-international armed conflicts present asymmetric legal and operational realities between states and armed factions.
While some scholars propose tailoring an armed group’s legal obligations to its practical capabilities, Kleffner warns that such an approach carries severe risks. Factions might use capacity constraints to justify diluting fundamental humanitarian standards rather than building the organizational capacity required to respect them.
Furthermore, the study highlights the danger of actors framing binding legal obligations as mere internal policies or voluntary decisions. This dilution blurs the line between legal obligation and discretionary policy, creating significant hurdles for establishing accountability for war crimes and human rights violations.
From the perspective of the Iranian Kurdistan Human Rights Watch (IKHRW), this debate holds significant practical weight. The conduct of non-state armed groups in conflict zones must be evaluated on real-world performance rather than public declarations or political promises. Voluntary pledges serve as meaningful tools for civilian protection only when they translate into genuine compliance, mechanisms for victim redress, and the prevention of human rights abuses.
Kleffner concludes that the expansion of unilateral commitments represents an irreversible shift in the law of war—neither inherently positive nor entirely detrimental. The ultimate challenge lies in ensuring these instruments reinforce and strengthen IHL compliance rather than undermining its binding legal foundation.
