Author: Farzad Marabi – Former PJAK Member (Submitted Op-Ed)
In a Middle East where ethnic, security, and geopolitical conflicts have been intertwined for decades, any window of opportunity to escape the cycle of violence holds historical significance. Recent developments surrounding the case of Abdullah Öcalan and the discourse on the “Right to Hope” must be viewed within this framework; not merely as a legal case, but as an opportunity to rethink the possibility of ending armed conflicts that have impacted security, development, and human life in Kurdish-populated areas for decades.
Abdullah Öcalan, the founder of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), was for past decades the symbol of one of the most prominent Kurdish armed movements in the region. Employing an approach rooted in armed struggle, the PKK attempted to advance the project of establishing an independent state called “Kurdistan” through guerrilla warfare and armed clashes. However, the passage of time, heavy human costs, widespread violence, civilian casualties, the destruction of infrastructure, and social erosion have confronted this path with severe challenges.
Turkey, as a NATO member positioned within the Western bloc, apprehended Öcalan in Kenya in 1999 through security cooperation with the United States and Israel. Yet, perhaps more important than his arrest were the subsequent developments that took shape in his thought and political approach.
While in prison, Öcalan gradually distanced himself from the idea of an independent Kurdish nation-state and, influenced by the theories of the American thinker Murray Bookchin, moved toward concepts such as “Democratic Confederalism”, local management, the devolution of power, and social self-governance. This shift is viewed by many not merely as an intellectual evolution, but as the result of redefining the regional and security equations surrounding the Kurdish issue.
During this same period, branches and factions close to the PKK in different countries across the region experienced divergent paths. In Iraq, the formation of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and its complex yet close relations with Turkey led to the restriction of the PKK’s operational environment. Security and economic cooperation between Ankara and Erbil dealt significant blows to the structures of this group.
In Syria, however, the situation was different. The Syrian civil war and the power vacuum in the north of the country provided a fresh opportunity for the Syrian branch of the PKK—a faction that later became known under various names and structures. The United States, within the framework of regional rivalries and the fight against ISIS, also created a sort of security buffer for these forces. Nonetheless, continuous pressure from Turkey and Ankara’s military operations prevented the full stabilization of this state of affairs.
In Iran as well, the branch known as PJAK has, since its inception, always been analyzed within a framework that transcends a mere local group. The publication of photographs and documents related to the presence of figures such as Kenneth Timmerman alongside the founders of PJAK has raised various perspectives regarding the external links and proxy functions of this group; a topic that has repeatedly been the subject of political and security debates over the past years.
Reviewing this history is important because it demonstrates that the Kurdish issue in the region has never been a purely domestic or ethnic matter, but has always been defined within the context of regional and international rivalries. However, what carries greater weight today is not the reproduction of the cycle of confrontation, but the search for a way out of it.
Within this framework, the discussion of the “Right to Hope” in Öcalan’s case holds special significance. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) declared in 2014 that depriving a prisoner of any possibility of future release violates human dignity and fundamental human rights. Based on this ruling, an “aggravated life sentence” without the possibility of parole review is incompatible with human rights principles.
Currently, within the political sphere of Turkey, discussions have emerged suggesting that the formal dissolution of the PKK and the termination of armed activities could pave the way for Öcalan to benefit from the “Right to Hope” and a revision of his legal status. Although the practical realization of this scenario remains a subject of doubt and dispute, the mere proposal of such an idea carries an important message: the possibility of transcending armed conflict through political and legal mechanisms.
This is precisely the point that can hold significance for the entire region; particularly in conditions where decades of armed violence have not only failed to yield sustainable achievements for the conflicting groups, but have instead institutionalized insecurity, widespread human rights violations, halted development, and caused social erosion.
Perhaps today, more than ever, there is a fundamental need for armed groups active in the region’s ethnic areas to ask the critical question: can continuing the military path still be the solution? The experience of past decades shows that war and violence, although capable of generating power at certain junctures, do not necessarily lead to the production of stability, development, and sustainable security.
Conversely, moving toward political dialogue, civil participation, democratic competition, and pursuing demands through non-violent pathways can facilitate a “win-win” model—a model that both recognizes identity and cultural demands and prevents societies from plunging into an endless cycle of violence.
Evidently, such a path is not simple. Years of armed struggle have become part of the identity and structure of many of these groups, and ending it is not merely a political decision; it requires a redefinition of their identity, strategy, and even historical legitimacy. Yet, perhaps it is precisely here that the true meaning of “political courage” manifests itself: the courage to end a war, not to continue it.
The Öcalan case and the discourse on the “Right to Hope,” independent of all political disagreements and complexities, can serve as an opportunity to contemplate this very possibility: can the region’s depleting armed conflicts be transferred onto the tracks of dialogue, politics, and development?
The definitive answer to this question does not rest with any media, institution, or analyst. However, articulating this possibility and proposing it as a rational alternative is a necessity that cannot be overlooked. Our region stands in need of a peace that is built not upon elimination and suppression, but upon dialogue, human rights, and development-oriented security.
